Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980 keeps professional negligence claims alive long after the ordinary time bars would have expired. Where the defendant has deliberately concealed a fact relevant to the claimant's right of action, time does not run until the claimant has, or could with reasonable diligence have, discovered the concealment. For professionals who fail to own up to a mistake, and for the PI insurers behind them, s.32 can convert a stale allegation into a live claim two decades after the underlying breach.
Section 32(1)(b) provides that where any fact relevant to the claimant's right of action has been deliberately concealed by the defendant, the limitation period does not begin to run until the claimant has discovered the concealment or could with reasonable diligence have done so. Section 32(2) deems concealment to have occurred where the defendant commits a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time — a deliberate breach carries deemed concealment with it, without a separate concealing act.
The critical structural point is the interaction with s.14A and the s.14B longstop. Under s.14A, latent damage claims in negligence enjoy a three-year period running from the date of knowledge; under s.14B, that extension is capped by a 15-year longstop from the negligent act or omission. Section 32 disapplies the s.14B longstop. Where deliberate concealment is established, the 15-year backstop falls away and the claim remains actionable for three years from the date the claimant discovered, or should have discovered, the concealed facts — with no outer limit.
The scope of s.32(1)(b) was clarified by the Supreme Court in Canada Square Operations Ltd v Potter [2023] UKSC 41. The court held that "deliberately" carries its ordinary meaning: the defendant must have intended to conceal the fact in question. Recklessness is not enough. The concealment must be an active state of affairs — a decision not to disclose a fact the defendant was under a duty to disclose, or a positive act of hiding — coupled with the intention that the claimant should not learn of it.
Earlier authority in Cave v Robinson Jarvis & Rolf [2002] UKHL 18 had already narrowed the section. The House of Lords held that s.32(2) is not triggered by mere carelessness: a professional who negligently overlooks a point has not thereby "deliberately" committed a breach of duty. Sheldon v RHM Outhwaite [1996] AC 102 remains the leading authority on subsequent concealment — concealment occurring after the cause of action has already accrued still resets the clock under s.32.
The concealed fact must be one that is relevant to the claimant's right of action — not merely helpful to the claim but genuinely necessary to plead it. That includes the fact of the breach itself, the identity of the person responsible, and material facts about the loss where the claimant needs them to formulate the claim. It does not extend to matters that would merely improve the claimant's evidence at trial. The distinction matters because insurers frequently argue the claimant knew enough to sue and was only missing helpful detail.
Worked example (illustration only). In 2005 a financial adviser recommends a personal pension arrangement. The adviser knows the product is unsuitable — the charging structure will erode the fund and a workplace scheme would have been the better route — but says nothing and books the commission. The client, unaware, transfers in.
In 2024 the client engages a new adviser who reviews the arrangement and identifies both the loss of value and the fact that the 2005 recommendation was unsuitable on any reasonable analysis. The primary six-year period under s.2 expired in 2011. The s.14A three-year period from knowledge would run from 2024 to 2027 — but on its face the s.14B 15-year longstop expired in 2020, so the s.14A route alone would fail. Section 32(1)(b), engaged by the adviser's deliberate non-disclosure of the unsuitability, disapplies the s.14B longstop. The claim is viable, and the adviser and their PI insurer are exposed almost 20 years after the underlying negligent act.
Section 32 claims receive close scrutiny from PI insurers. The loss is often crystallised — time has removed uncertainty about the outcome of the negligent advice. An allegation of deliberate concealment also sits close to an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty exclusions and conduct clauses in the underlying policy may be engaged. A firm notifying a s.32 claim should expect its insurer to reserve rights and examine the professional-conduct implications in parallel with the civil defence.
For professions with long-tail exposures — financial advisers, solicitors handling trust and estate work, tax advisers, surveyors reporting on latent defects — this is the provision that makes historic files matter. Apex advises clients on the structure and adequacy of PI cover where s.32 exposure is a material feature of the risk. Related material is available in the pillars on PI insurance for IFAs, PI insurance for solicitors, and PI insurance for accountants. The companion entry on Limitation Act 1980 s.14A covers the latent-damage regime that s.32 sits alongside.
Apex Insurance Brokers Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Firm reference number 724952. This entry is general information, not advice on any particular policy.